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SCIENCE

AND EDUCATION

The Role of Natural Science Courses in Liberal Education
KARL D. FEZER University of Minnesota, Morris

I.
The purpose of courses in natural science traditionally
has been to convey the conclusions of science to the student. Recent proposals, such as the Laboratory Block
Program (Glass 1961a, 1961b, Grohman 1961), stress
the idea that students should experience science as a
process for acquiring knowledge. The thesis of this paper
is that the scientific process, and especially the attitudes
and concepts that characterize it, are relevant to all human problems that can be considered rationally, even
those outside the domains of established scientific disciplines. Critical thinking is part of the scientific process,
and courses in the natural sciences, by virtue of the perceptual foundation and ready availability of their subject
matter, are at least as well suited for teaching critical
thinking as are courses in any other discipline. Science
courses have an excellent opportunity, not only to enable
students to experience the scientific process, but also to
help them see its relevance to everyday life. Therefore,
science teachers should help their students develop an
automatic scientific response to problems in general.
A list of the components of a scientific response to
problems might include the assumptions, attitudes, habits
of thought, and concepts mentioned in the paragraphs
that follow:
Nearly all science assumes an orderly, law-abiding universe progressing through time. Knowledge of such a
universe will aid in the prediction, and possibly control,
of events. Although absolute knowledge is not attainable
(Royce 1959), useful or interesting tentative knowledge
is attainable, and the scientific process has been remarkably successful in producing tentative knowledge, i.e.,
adequately credible beliefs.
The mental processes involved in a scientific response
to problems include the accumulation, synthesis, and•
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analysis of ideas. The scientific "method" is sometimes
represented as consisting of these three processes in sequence. Actually, the synthesis of ideas may involve very
little "method," and the same is often true for accumulation. Furthermore, the three processes mentioned may be
carried on in haphazard sequence or almost concurrently.
They may be carried on af various levels; ideas that are
accumulated, synthesized, or analyzed may relate to the
primary problems being studied or to some subsidiary
technique that is useful in the analysis of the primary
hypothesis. It should be noted, too, that a process is not
scientific merely because it involves the accumulation,
synthesis, and analysis of ideas. Rather, it is the manner
in which these processes are carried out that is important.
To be scientific, the accumulation of ideas should be
objective, open-minded, free of prejudice. This requires
recognition of the ease with which bias can color human
perception. Furthermore, to obtain sufficienf ideas for an
adequate synthesis, the accumulation must, at least to a
degree, be voracious. This implies minds hungry for ideas,
minds that know the joy of learning.
The synthesis of new ideas is the creative aspect of science. This is the "inductive leap." It may appear as an
inescapable generalization from newly observed facts, or
as an intuition or hunch, or as sudden enlightenment.
The "brainstorming" sessions used in business and elsewhere attempt to create the uninhibited atmosphere that
promotes such innovation. Some of the great syntheses of
science are claimed to have come about during sleep. The
greatest discoveries usually involve the greatest deviations
from accepted patterns of thought. This is not inconsistent with the fact that the odds on making a valid discovery also depend on the degree of insight and judgment of
the would-be discoverer.
It may be difficult to induce in students ( or in one97

self!) that combination of creativity and judgment that
results in successful scientific synthesis. It should be less
difficult to teach some concepts that find wide use in scientific explanation. The concept that the universe is
mechanistic and deterministic, that every effect has its
causes, is basic to most science. The concept of a nonteleological universe helps scientists avoid explanations
that fail to explain, that mislead, and that obscure the
operation of natural mechanisms. The concept that natural phenomena can be studied at different levels of organization is most easily illustrated in biology. The description of what happens at one level may help explain
how or for what reason something happens at a higher or
lower level ( Simpson, 1962). Understanding phenomena
requires that they be studied at as many different levels
as possible, and that the analyses for the different levels
remain clearly distinguished. This is important in .the
definition of terms and in the formulation of hypotheses.
Scientists quickly acquire the concept that most effects
result from the operation of many factors, and also that
quantitative consideration of these factors contributes to
better understanding of their roles. When multiple fac-'
tors act jointly, they may do so in a non-additive manner, as in synergism, dominance, epistasis, and all other
kinds of interaction. All these considerations serve to
dramatize the fantastic complexity of most natural phenomena. This complexity limits man's ability to control,
to predict, or even to understand events and it forces
him to resort to the concept of probability. Experimental evidence provides enough information concerning some phenomena, so that the probability of the occurrence of certain events can be known precisely; this
makes prediction possible, though at a level less specific
than the prediction of specific events. Commonly much
less evidence is available, and the concept of probability
is also used to quantify an individual's estimate of likely
outcome or proper explanation, based on his judgment of
the importance and functioning of various factors.
The analysis of ideas consists of logically deducing
their consequences and then critically evaluating these
deductions, preferably by means of experiments. An
awareness of the concept of confounding permeates scientific analysis. "Confounding" is here used in its broad
sense -i.e., the mingling of elements or factors so that
they or their effects cannot be distinguished - not in its
limited statistical sense. The mere existence of alternative
explanations implies confounding in the broad sense. The
concept of bias and the related distinction between precision and accuracy are based on the concept of confounding. The occurrence of uncontrolled variability represents confounding, and scientists must consequently
consider questions of sample size and replication and
must express their conclusions in probabilistic terms.
Confusion of analyses at different levels of organization
can also lead to confounding ( Grobstein 1962). The
concept that falsifiability, rather than verifiability, is the
critical attribute of an hypothesis that is capable of being
objectively evaluated should be strictly applied only to
certain classes of hypotheses. For other kinds of hypotheses, verifiability is a more appropriate criterion. In a
98

broader sense, however, the concept applies to the statement and testing of all hypotheses, because it implicitly
stresses that the analyst of an hypothesis must have a real
opportunity to reject it. Criteria for the rejection of an
hypothesis should be established before it is tested. Another important concept is the distinction between laws
and theories, which neatly emphasizes how great a body
of evidence is required before an idea can achieve ultimate acceptance in science. The modification of laws
illustrates the tentative nature of even the most ultimate
acceptance that science can give its findings.
While the criteria for ultimate acceptance of an idea in
science are exceedingly stringent, scientists often tentatively accept ideas that seem sensible to them, even on
the basis of very limited evidence. Scientists and nonscientists alike believe many things, and the strength with
which each belief is held is reflected by the amount of
evidence that would be necessary to bring about a reversal in belief. Every man probably believes some things
for no adequate reason. With regard to matters requiring
decisions, however, men must adopt beliefs, no matter how
scanty the information on which beliefs can be based. An
example is the physician who, failing to arrive at a definite diagnosis, must nevertheless tell his patient what to
do, even if it is merely to wait and see what happens.
This concept applies equally to the scientist whose approach to a new problem may have to be based on very
inadequately founded beliefs concerning the most promising line of investigation. In science, such beliefs are
called "working hypotheses." If men would synonymize
this term with "beliefs," they might, without immediately
altering their beliefs, be more open to modifying them in
the light of further evidence. If absolute knowledge is indeed not attainable, then all human knowledge really
consists of beliefs that should be regarded as working
hypotheses. This, incidentally, does not exclude the possibility of religious commitment to certain beliefs for as
long as those beliefs are held. In general, the adoption of
objectively unsubstantiated or unsubstantiable beliefs regarding specific issues should be determined ( and is to a
considerable extent) by man's need for such beliefs as
a guide to his physical and mental behavior.

II.
In the opinion of one biologist, the attitudes and ideas
mentioned above are equally relevant to problems of cellular metabolism, juvenile delinquency, or war and peace.
Opinions as to what science is and what habits of thought
might be transferable from the traditional subject matter
of science to the solution of human problems in general
will vary, of course, with the individual teacher's field,
experience, and philosophy of life. In the light of modern
physics, for example, a physicist might question the universal applicability of determinism, or he might wish to
stress principles other than those listed. Others might object to complete determinism on the basis of religious
faith or social philosophy. A philosopher might question
falsifiability as a criterion for evaluating hypotheses. But
this does not mean that a teacher should exclude from
his courses the opinions he holds concerning the general
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social applicability of habits of thought cultivated by
practice of his discipline. On the contrary, it means that
all teachers should include such thoughts in their courses.
Of course, they should also attempt to do justice to opposing points of view, and to indicate the degree of acceptance accorded their own b~liefs. Students would then
be exposed to a wide range of beliefs and attitudes relevant
the important issues of life,. and those on which
faculty consensus is greatest would be reinforced. Besides
providing students with a better basis for reaching their
own conclusions, such evidence of faculty concern with
the issues of life might awaken the interest of otherwise
apathetic students ( and citizens) in these issues.
Some of the developments in the social sciences illustrate the potential of the scientific process when applied
to problems outside the traditional domain of natural
science. One striking example of the widening application of the scientific process is the gradually changing
response of the United States to one of the world's greatest problems, the armaments race. There has been considerable activity with regard to the scientific and technical aspects of disarmament. Even more significantly,
the study of political and economic aspects of disarmament seems gradually to be acquiring more of the attributes of the scientific process (Lear 1960). In the United
States today many groups and individuals, in and out of
government, are engaged in an imaginative search for
ways of dealing with the arms race, and it is not surprising to find scientists, especially physicists, in the forefront
of this search. Proposals ranging from those favoring
"pre-emptive" war to those advocating unilateral disarmament and non-violent resistance are being considered.
Unrealistically simplistic solutions are being recognized
for what they are; instead, a multiplicity of factors is
being considered quantitatively. There is a growing recognition that all possible policies must be considered in
probabilistic terms, because all involve risks. Attempts
are being made to increase the likelihood of a negotiated
agreement by determining not only what kinds of disarmament schemes might be acceptable to the United States,
but also what kinds might be acceptable to the Soviet
Union (Blackett 1962). Wright (1961) goes a step further and advocates the establishment of scientific research
institutes devoted to solving problems of disarmament.
His example of the kind of problem that such an institute
might study is illuminating: how to prevent secret nuclear
rearmament and surprise nuclear attack by means of inspection by natives of the country being inspected. This
idea seems ridiculous at first and may indeed be unworkable. But Wright proceeds to make a good enough case
for the idea to convince the writer that it should be studied further. There may be overwhelming objections to
such a propos·a1, but the scientific response to such a proposal, if it offers any hope of being workable, is to attempt to find ways of overcoming the objections.

to
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III.
In conclusion, it would benefit mankind if the attitudes
and concepts presented in this paper as characterizing the
scientific process - give or take some from the list - became part of people's way of life. The science teacher,
therefore, should consider it his task to both point out
the relevance of these ideas to life in general and to provide his students with experiences that will increase the
likelihood of their incorporating them into their lives. Descriptions of Utopia often serve as vehicles for the statement of social goals. In the writer's Utopia there would
be no shortage of problems. However, most citizens of
this Utopia would have adopted the ideas and attitudes
discussed above. There would be differences of political
opinion, and political parties to match. But these parties
would not represent dyed-in-the-wool radicals or conservatives. They would, instead, represent groups of individuals who, after weighing the probabilities and applying their judgment, decided to commit themselves to
some working hypothesis, until faced by sufficient contradictory evidence to warrant a change of commitment.
Such a society would not be overly fond of the status quo,
but neither would it be overly eager to overthrow it. It
would recognize both the achievements of the past and
the opportunities for progress. And to achieve progress,
it would be deliberately experimental; it would encourage
political, economic, and social experimentation. A challenge to liberal education, and to science courses contributing to it, is to help individuals and society to move in
this direction.
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